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Abstract
This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identifica-
tion of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach
is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem
is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues
are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying
beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For
the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences
need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature
of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We
also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We
show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers.
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1 Introduction: the betting approach to the iden-
tification of beliefs
Suppose you want to identify the beliefs of an agent regarding the truth of
a proposition or the realization of an event. This is sometimes necessary.
For instance, if you are interested in opinion aggregation or in any topic
studied in interactive epistemology, the identification of individual beliefs is
a prerequisite.1 This paper focuses on such identification. By assumption,
it considers this identification as an end in itself and not just as a means to,
say, predict the agent’s behavior. While we want to stress from the outset
that this is an irreducible assumption of our paper, we also want to highlight
that this is not an artificial one. For instance, it might be that the agent is
an expert and that you want to identify her beliefs not to predict her actions,
but to help in your own decision-making.
There are at least two conceivable ways to identify beliefs. To start with,
following a direct approach, one can simply ask the agent about the beliefs
she holds. An example of this is when judgments of comparative likelihood2
are accepted as primitive data. The standard economic approach, by con-
trast, is indirect. Its goal is to infer beliefs from preference data.3 Among
other things, this is meant to ensure that the beliefs identified are the ones
upon which the agent is ready to act in her own decision-making. Specifi-
cally, this approach is essentially inspired by betting behavior. Admittedly,
assuming an agent prefers being wealthy to being poor, her willingness to
1See e.g. Genest and Zidek, 1986 and Clemen and Winkler, 2007 for reviews of the
literature on probabilistic opinion aggregation. See footnote 56 regarding the necessity of
identifying beliefs when the goal is to aggregate preferences (rather than simply opinions)
on uncertain outcomes. Regarding interactive epistemology, see in particular the agree-
ment theorem literature, originating in Aumann, 1976 and reviewed e.g. in Bonanno and
Nehring, 1997.
2This is the school of Koopman (1940), Good (1950) or Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg
(1959). Although they all belong to the probabilistic tradition more specifically, we use
the term likelihood to stay neutral regarding the structure of the beliefs to be identified.
3This is the school of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), Savage (1954/1972), and
followers.
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place money on one event rather than another prima facie suggests that she
thinks the first is more likely to occur than the second. By betting, one tries
not to change, but merely to benefit from the way one believes the world
goes. For this reason, betting is but a minimal form of action which can be
used, when some basic preferences are known, to infer beliefs. In this paper,
any preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs will be called a
version of the betting approach. The betting approach is exemplified in most
concrete elicitation techniques,4 as well as in the theoretical results these
techniques rely on. It is the topic of this paper.
From a decision-theoretic point of view, the betting approach raises spe-
cific questions. These questions do not pertain to the structure of the beliefs
to be identified. Given a state space, the agent’s beliefs may or may not take
the form of a unique probability measure depending on, say, her take on
Ellsberg’s (1961) problem. Nor do those questions regard the decision rule
she follows with respect to her beliefs. She may or may not be an expected
utility maximizer depending on, say, her reaction to Allais’ (1953) problem,
when uncertainty reduces to risk. A preliminary issue5 to all those familiar
questions is whether it is possible that her beliefs are revealed by her pref-
erences, in other words, that her preferences are relied on as a measurement
device. For a suggestive counterexample, imagine the following situation.
A remote country is holding general elections, and you have incentives to
anticipate their outcome correctly. Being unknowledgeable about politics,
you seek the opinion of a local expert. She believes that this particular can-
didate will win. Unbeknownst to you, however, she as an individual voter
is a passionate opponent of this candidate. She thinks of his election as an
irreversible disaster for her country, so much in fact that she simply does
4See e.g. Schlag, Tremewan, and van der Weele, 2015 for a review of those techniques.
5Admittedly, there is at least one other issue which can be considered preliminary to
the ones above. When preferences are interpreted as choices, the betting approach to the
identification of beliefs is confronted with the problem of moral hazard (defined in Arrow,
1965, p. 142 and anticipated in Drèze, 1961, p. 78). Section 3.1 introduces this problem
and discusses how it relates to that of state-dependent utility, the topic of this paper.
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not care about any payoff she could collect in the event that he is elected.
Therefore, her betting decisions with respect to this event are bound to lead
you astray regarding what she believes, and thus what you should believe,
about the result of the elections. As we will cash it out formally later on, the
key issue is that her utility function (for money, in this example) depends on
the prevailing state of nature (specifically, which candidate is elected) in a
certain way. In the terminology of this paper, the problem of state-dependent
utility refers to the fact that the preferences of a decision-maker can impede
the identification of her beliefs, as illustrated by this case among other re-
lated ones. Noteworthily, state-dependent utility is not always a problem.
In insurance economics,6 for instance, in line with ordinary thinking, it is
common to assume that the decision-maker’s utility function depends on her
health status, and this is not the source of any particular problem. However,
state-dependent utility stands in the way of identifying beliefs following the
betting approach.7 This is the problem which this paper investigates.
This paper presents the problem of state-dependent utility in full detail,
explains how it can be solved, and extracts from it a conceptual message of
interest to both economists and philosophers. This last aspect is our main
contribution. We show that the problem of state-dependent utility illus-
trates, so to speak from within, the limits of the revealed preference frame-
work which officially prevails in economics. We explain that this should draw
the attention of philosophers, especially those thinking about the appropri-
ate way to investigate beliefs and concerned about the potential defects of
6The introduction of state-dependent utility in theoretical insurance economics is due
to Arrow (see Arrow, 1953, 1973). See e.g. Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo, 2013
for recent empirical work on insurance demand under state-dependent utility.
7Relatedly, state-dependent utility is a source of complication for pragmatic arguments
for probabilism (the claim according to which rational beliefs should take the form of
a unique probability measure over a given set space), the expected utility rule, and the
like. Some such arguments are known as the Dutch book arguments (see Hájek, 2008 for
a review). It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess how these arguments fare in light
of state-dependent utility issues (a topic Nau has investigated, see in particular 1995).
Section 3.4, however, relates the conceptual discussion of state-dependent utility issues to
the better-known philosophical discussions of pragmatic arguments for probabilism.
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preference-based approaches. Our paper proceeds as follows. For the sake
of simplicity and without loss of generality (this claim is justified in sec-
tion 2.6), it focuses on Bayesian agents, whose beliefs take the form of a
unique probability measure on a given state space and whose decisions are
compatible with the expected utility rule. Faced with Ellsberg’s and Allais’
problems, they have non-paradoxical preferences. The first part of the paper
is set in the framework of Savage’s theorem. Four types of state-dependent
utility issues are distinguished, one of which has not yet been discussed in the
literature. Each of these issues is an obstacle for the basic betting approach,
which we take Savage’s result to embody. Several methodological comments
are offered to explain why decision theorists rarely take all of these issues
into account. The second part of the paper considers a theorem by Karni
and Schmeidler, which illustrates the simplest way to revise the basic betting
approach so as to achieve the identification of beliefs. Identification, never-
theless, comes at a price: for beliefs to be identified as Karni and Schmeidler
explain, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that such
an enlargement is indeed necessary to solve the problem of state-dependent
utility, which leads to the final discussion of revealed preference previewed
above. Thus, technically as well as conceptually, our paper offers a unified
perspective on state-dependent utility issues.
2 The problem of state-dependent utility
2.1 Theme: the case of Mr. Smith
Consider the following case, which is famous among decision theorists and
can be used to give a comprehensive statement of the problem of state-
dependent utility.8 Mr. Smith’s wife, Mrs. Smith, is gravely ill. She has
to undergo a crucial operation that will either kill her or cure her for good.
8It was sketched by Aumann in private correspondence with Savage. Thanks to Drèze,
the letters have been made public in Savage and Aumann, 1987.
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Suppose you want to identify Mr. Smith’s beliefs, specifically, the ones he
holds regarding the success or the failure of that operation. Imagine for
instance he is a surgeon, and he is familiar with the medical procedure. His
wife, for one, might be interested in knowing what he, as an expert, thinks of
her chances of survival. She might even decide whether or not to undergo the
operation based on his opinion on the matter. Assume she asks a decision
theorist to apply the betting approach for her. To reveal Mr. Smith’s beliefs,
the decision theorist will let him place various sums of money either on the
success or on the failure of the operation. Mr. Smith is a Bayesian agent:
he attributes a certain subjective probability value to the first event and a
complementary value to the other event. Yet Mr. Smith is also a husband:
his life would be utterly changed, were his wife to die. We will show that this
modest fact has far-reaching implications, namely, it determines the degree
to which his beliefs can be identified following the betting approach.
To verify this, let us place the case of Mr. Smith in the framework of
Savage’s (1954/1972) theorem, the prime example of the betting approach
in decision theory. Let S be the set of states of nature, define an event
as any subset of this set, and let 2S be the set of all possible events. Let
X be the set of consequences. Let a decision-maker be characterized by
a preference relation < on F := XS , the set of all possible acts, with 
and ∼ referring to strict preference and indifference. Savage’s theorem gives
sufficient conditions for < to be representable according to the subjective
expected utility model. Under those conditions, there exists a utility function
u : X → R, unique up to a positive affine transformation, and a unique
subjective probability function pi< : 2S → R such that, for all acts f and g,
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the following equivalence holds:9
f < g ⇔
∫
S
u [f(s)] dpi<(s) ≥
∫
S
u [g(s)] dpi<(s). (1)
Suppose then, more precisely, that the decision theorist tries to identify
Mr. Smith’s subjective probability function pi< following Savage’s approach.
To specify Mr. Smith’s preference relation according to his predicament, we
shall focus on a concrete version of Savage’s framework. Let X be a set of
monetary results, X = [0, 100], and S be the unit interval, S = (0, 1]. With
γ ∈ (0, 1] varying for the sake of convenience, let E∗ = (0, γ] correspond
to the event that the operation succeeds and E∗ = (γ, 1] to the event that
it fails. Considering Mr. Smith as a Bayesian decision-maker, let him be
endowed with a unique subjective probability measure on 2S , denoted by
pi∗. For the sake of simplicity, let pi∗ be such10 that for any event E = (a, b],
pi∗(E) = b− a. Considering Mr. Smith as a husband, let his utility function
vary depending on the outcome of the operation, which gives a simple il-
lustration of the state-dependent utility phenomena. In what follows, while
always assuming that uE∗(x) = x, we consider various forms for uE∗(x)
expressing various ways he might react to the death of his wife.11 Four reac-
tions are examined. They are four variations on one theme, given that our
assumptions imply that Mr. Smith’s preferences will always be representable
by a function v∗ : F → R that can be decomposed as follows:
9Under those conditions, it is also the case that S is infinite, that pi< is non-atomic and
finitely additive, and that u is bounded (see e.g. Fishburn, 1970, chapter 14, and further
technical clarifications in Wakker, 1993). These restrictions on u and on pi< indicate that
Savage’s conditions do not characterize all preference relations representable according to
the subjective expected utility model.
10Specifically, we suppose that pi∗ is a non-atomic finitely additive probability function
on 2S , the σ-algebra of all subsets of S = (0, 1], such that the probability of any interval
in (0, 1] simply is its length. It follows from a classical result in Horn and Tarski, 1948
that such a function exists.
11For the sake of concreteness, the case of Mr. Smith is presented with a dynamic twist,
but this is inessential to the argument. For instance, you could be with him in the hospital
waiting room and willing to identify his beliefs regarding the outcome of the operation on










In each variation on uE∗(x), by assumption, beliefs are also specified in pi
∗.
The question is whether one can, following the betting approach, identify
these beliefs which have been fixed by assumption. This amounts to checking
the reliability of preferences, taken as a measurement device for identifying
beliefs. Admittedly, this is done under the supposition that the framework
above accurately describes Mr. Smith’s situation. We are well aware that
this is a debatable issue, but we postpone the discussion of description or
re-description until all four variations have been examined.12
2.2 First variation: the cautious husband
Consider first the following reaction. Were his wife to die, Mr. Smith would
become more cautious: without her support, he would abandon any ambi-
tious project he would have undertaken otherwise.13 From an economic point
of view, this can be interpreted as a change in risk attitude. Mr. Smith being
a Bayesian decision-maker, his utility function must express this new risk at-
titude. Let us then assume that uE∗(x) =
√
x, for instance. For the sake of
convenience, let us also suppose that γ = 12 , so that pi
∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∗) = 12 .
Among the four types of state-dependent utility issues presented in this
paper, this one is the best known of all (see e.g. Karni and Schmeidler,
1993, p. 269 for a representative mention). It is also the closest to the form
of state-dependent utility commonly considered in the insurance literature.
12See section 3.1. Our message at this point is essentially the following: before debating
of re-description, let us first have a comprehensive look at all there would be to re-describe.
13Philosophers might think that this kind of example requires the assumption that, as
he evaluates bets, Mr. Smith agrees with his future (more or less cautious) self. First,
as we argued in footnote 11, the dynamic twist of the story is conceptually inessential.
Second, notice that even if it mattered, no more agreement with one’s future self would be
required in state-dependent utility cases like the one above, than in any state-independent
utility counterpart (as when Mr. Smith anticipates to stay just the same, were his wife to
die). The same observation applies to the other variations on the case of Mr. Smith.
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Because of such cautiousness, Mr. Smith’s beliefs cannot be identified follow-
ing Savage’s approach. Indeed, in his model, it is crucial that bets indicate
the same beliefs, whichever the stakes used. Let us express this requirement
formally. Abusing notation, let x stand for the constant act which associates
the consequence x to all states of nature. Let xEy stand for the act giving
the consequence x if the true state of nature is in E and giving the con-
sequence y otherwise. For the bets taken by the decision-maker to induce
a well-defined likelihood order on the set of events, Savage’s fourth postu-
late requires that for all consequences x, y, x′, y′ such that x  y, x′  y′,
and for all events E,E′, we have xEy  xE′y if and only if x′Ey′  x′E′y′.
This postulate is the only one of Savage’s postulates that is violated in our
case.14 Despite their being generated by a perfectly well-defined underlying
subjective probability function pi∗, Mr. Smith’s preferences induce an incon-
sistent likelihood order on the set of events. Thus it would not be possible
to proceed from this likelihood order to any numerical representation of it.
Savage’s fourth postulate is central to his influential approach to the
identification of beliefs. It is also very closely related to the motivating in-
terpretation of beliefs in terms of willingness to bet. Yet notice it cannot
be considered as a compelling rationality condition. Certainly, it is a consis-
tency condition. But the consistency in question concerns the measurement
technique proposed and should not be extended too hastily to the subjective
attitudes to be measured following this technique. As the present variation
illustrates, the postulate requires the invariance of risk attitudes,15 whichever
14Consider (2), as fully specified with uE∗(x) =
√
x and E∗ = (0, 1
2
]. First, check that
x > y ⇔ x  y. Then, taking e.g. x = 100, y = 0 = y′, x′ = 9, E = (0, 1
10
], E′ = ( 1
2
, 1],
check that x  y, x′  y′, xEy  xE′y but x′Ey′ ≺ x′E′y′.
15In the Bayesian context we are focusing on here, “risk attitude” refers to the concavity
properties of the utility function. From a mathematical point of view, when all the other
postulates of Savage’s theorem are respected, Savage’s fourth postulate amounts to re-
quiring that all (non-constant) conditional utility functions are related by a positive affine
transformation. This appears more explicitly in a related theorem, due to Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). This paper draws several comparisons between Savage’s theorem and the
Anscombe-Aumann theorem. The framework of the latter result is adopted in section 3.
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the true state of nature. As this phrasing highlights, this is obviously not
a requirement of rationality. This implication16 of Savage’s fourth postu-
late should be highlighted more often than it is. A pioneer of the betting
approach, de Finetti could identify the beliefs of Bayesian agents, provided
they were risk-neutral.17 His successor Savage generalizes de Finetti’s ap-
proach, but only partially in this respect. His model can accommodate any
risk attitude, including strict risk aversion or risk seeking. But it can only
accommodate one risk attitude, independently of the true state of nature.
2.3 Second variation: the ascetic husband
Let us turn to another possible reaction. Were his wife to die, Mr. Smith
would abandon all worldly concerns: he would devote the rest of his life to
prayer and meditation. To capture this ascetic stance, let us suppose that
uE∗(x) = −x, for instance. For the sake of convenience, let us also suppose
that γ = 23 , so that pi
∗(E∗) = 23 and pi
∗(E∗) = 13 .
Such asceticism also stands in the way of the betting approach. As
we explain in several steps, this is only partially analyzed in the current
literature. It can be proved that Savage’s fourth postulate is respected here.18
As a result, Mr. Smith’s preferences induce a well-defined likelihood order
on the set of events. Yet, the order induced is useless from a probabilistic
point of view, because it suggests that Mr. Smith holds impossible events
to be strictly more likely to happen than some possible events - namely, the
16This is but an implication of the postulate. The content of the postulate is far more
general, in particular because like all of Savage’s postulates, it applies to arbitrary sets
of consequences, non-numerical ones included (in which case, risk attitudes cannot be
defined).
17See de Finetti, 1937 (for a modern exposition, see e.g. Gilboa, 2009, chapter 9).
18See the Appendix for a proof. Taken together, the cautious husband case and the
ascetic husband case establish the logical independence of Savage’s third and fourth pos-
tulates. The framework of Anscombe and Aumann would prove less flexible than Savage’s
on this topic. Endowed with the usual axioms, it would not let the difference between the
cautious husband case and the ascetic husband case be fully expressed.
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event that the operation fails.19 As indicated by the function pi∗, he believes
that this event can occur. But this fact cannot be accurately recognized
by Savage’s take on the betting approach. Savage cannot proceed to any
probabilistic numerical representation of the likelihood order discovered.
One aspect of this problem is well understood: Mr. Smith’s asceticism vi-
olates another of Savage’s postulates which excludes such troublesome cases.
Let xEh stand for the act that gives the consequence x if the true state
of nature is in E, and that is identical to some other act h otherwise. De-
fine E as null for a decision-maker if for all consequences x and y, we have
xEh ∼ yEh, and define it as non-null otherwise. For the bets taken by the
decision-maker to induce a likelihood order that is a qualitative probability
relation, Savage requires that preferences conditional on non-null events are
related to preferences over constant acts as simply as possible. Specifically,
his third postulate requires in particular that, for all consequences x, y, and
for any non-null event E, if x  y, then xEh  yEh. This postulate is the
only one of Savage’s postulates that is violated in our case.20 The following
analogy may help in realizing how restrictive it is. In another context, it
would say that if a social preference exists, then it has to be unanimous.
Crucially, the implication above does not correspond to the more familiar
and uncontroversial converse implication according to which if there is a
unanimous preference, then it has to be the social preference too.
To the best of our knowledge, however, it has not yet been pointed out
in the literature that a violation of Savage’s third postulate need not entail
a violation of his fourth. This is what our example illustrates, unlike other
19Consider (2), as fully specified with uE∗(x) = −x and E∗ = (0, 23 ]. Taking e.g. x = 1,
y = 0, check that x  y and that x∅y  xE∗y. This means that ∅ is revealed to be held
strictly more likely to happen than E∗. This disqualifies the likelihood order induced by
Mr. Smith’s preferences as a qualitative probability relation (as defined in Fishburn, 1970,
p. 195). It is the most consensual property of qualitative probability relations, sometimes
called “non-negativity”, which fails here to be satisfied.
20Take e.g. x = 1, y = 0, E = E∗. First, check that x  y, and that E is non-null.
Then, taking h = x for example, check that xEh ≺ yEh, which violates the postulate.
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more familiar counterexamples to Savage’s third postulate.21 More generally,
our example suggests that the literature should abandon the terminology
according to which Savage’s third and fourth postulates impose, respectively,
“ordinal” and “cardinal” forms of state-independence upon the preferences of
the decision-maker.22 Specifically, this terminology suggests that if the latter
form of state-independence obtains, then the former does as well. As detailed
above, this is disproved by the present variation on the case of Mr. Smith.
Presumably, Savage and others have checked the logical independence of
the two postulates in question, but they may have thought that the math-
ematical observation underlying this subsection did not deserve to be re-
ported. We disagree (for reasons that will appear in section 3.4), and we
find their omission interesting in its own right. It is best explained, we
believe, as follows. First, it is related to the importance of economic inter-
pretations of decision-theoretic frameworks: from the standpoint of economic
applications, the problems raised by preferences that would be decreasing in
the amount of money received, as in our case of asceticism, are certainly not
the most urgent to consider. Second, based on the motivating interpretation
of beliefs in terms of willingness to bet, theorists probably reason as follows.
There is little point in extracting a comparative likelihood relation if it is
to deliver probabilistically unintelligible information, the argument goes, so
that Savage’s fourth postulate should be considered only when his third is
also satisfied. Yet, in both cases, privileged interpretations of the formalism
are put forward, rather than logical arguments. This is illustrative of the
way decision theorists often conduct axiomatic analysis: their mathemat-
ical work is oriented by pre-existing interpretations of their objects. The
omission we are highlighting now is just one consequence of this influence.
Digging further into the problem of state-dependent utility, we shall see that
21See for instance Savage’s own (meteorological) case in Savage, 1954/1972, p. 25.
22For this terminology, see e.g. Wakker and Zank, 1999, p. 10, or Hill, 2010, p. 2045. It
proves more relevant in the framework of Anscombe and Aumann, in which it originates.
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it has other implications which are less apparent and even more significant.
2.4 Third variation: the devastated husband
Consider yet another reaction (which corresponds to the election case sketched
in the introduction). Were his wife to die, Mr. Smith would be devastated:
come what may, nothing would matter to him anymore. Let us suppose
accordingly that, whichever the consequence x, uE∗(x) = c, with c some
constant. For the sake of convenience, let us also suppose that γ = 12 , so
that pi∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∗) = 12 .
In this case, Mr. Smith’s preferences satisfy all of Savage’s postulates,
and the betting approach does not run into any apparent obstacle. Yet,
another problem arises, which is less familiar but not less challenging than
the two previous ones (see e.g. Drèze, 1987, p. 67 or Karni, Schmeidler, and
Vind, 1983, p. 1025 for discussions). While Mr. Smith’s intimate conviction
is that pi∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∗) > 0, Savage must infer from his preferences that
pi<(E∗) > pi<(E∗) = 0. Indeed, in the present variation, the event that the
operation fails qualifies as a null event and, in Savage’s theorem, null events
must be associated with a null subjective probability value.23 By contrast,
this variation illustrates the fact that, even under the constraint of all of
Savage’s postulates, this is not an implication of Mr. Smith’s preferences
but merely one interpretation which is compatible with them. Even when all
of Savage’s postulates are satisfied, it cannot be decided whether preferences
conditional on null events should be decomposed as Savage suggests, as the
product of a null subjective probability value and a non-constant utility
function, or rather as the product of a strictly positive subjective probability
value and a conditionally constant utility function. For terminological clarity,
23Consider (2), as fully specified with uE∗(x) = c and E
∗ = (0, 1
2
]. Taking e.g. x = 1
and y = 0, check that xE∗y  xE∗y and that xE∗y ∼ x∅y. Noteworthily, in Savage’s own
presentation of his theorem, the claim that an event is null if and only if it is associated
with a null subjective probability value is stated on a par with the general representation
in (1).
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let us refer to the former case as that of cognitively null events (a matter of
probability, in the representation), and to the latter case as that conatively
null events (a matter of utility, in the representation).24 In effect, Savage
claims that all null events are of the cognitive variety. Yet, in his framework,
it cannot be decided whether a null event is of the cognitive or of the conative
variety, because the same preferences are induced in both cases.
We shall refer to this problem as the problem of null events. Unlike the
two previous issues, but similar to the one presented next, it does not pertain
to the existence of a revealed qualitative probability relation. From now on in
this section, such an existence is secured. As a result, it will always be possi-
ble to identify a subjective probability function following Savage’s approach.
Yet, it is still to be checked whether this subjective probability function re-
ally is the only one compatible with the underlying preferences that have
been first given. Thus, what is fundamentally at issue is whether the qual-
itative probability relation induced by Mr. Smith’s preferences should be
considered, as Savage assumes, as a relevant guide to his beliefs.
The problem of null events is reminiscent of underdetermination problems
which non-triviality suppositions, like Savage’s fifth postulate,25 are meant to
rule out. A decision theorist cannot tell much of an agent’s beliefs if the agent
is indifferent between all available options: such preferences are compatible
with any set of beliefs. Accordingly, agents are typically required to express
one strict preference at least. But what is true of the total event is also true of
any partial event. The only difference is that it would be overly restrictive26
to require that, conditional on any partial event, the agent express a strict
preference. This would simply rule out the case that any possible event is
null and thus that any event other than the impossible ones, represented by
24It is readily checked that the two concepts are logically independent.
25This postulate requires that there exists consequences x, y such that x  y.
26Besides, it would be impossible in Savage’s model because his postulates imply that
all states, viz. degenerate events, are null (this is why it is required that there are infinitely
many of them, so that the non-triviality postulate above can nonetheless be satisfied).
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the empty set, is associated with a null subjective probability value.
To acknowledge the structural underdetermination illustrated by this
variation on the case of Mr. Smith, the uniqueness clause of Savage’s repre-
sentation theorem must be revised.27 Assume null events are the only ones
to raise underdetermination issues regarding subjective probability values.28
Then, in (1)29, pi< is replaceable by another probability function pi′< if and




pi<(E′) . In other words, for any
null event E′′, the probability value pi′<(E′′) can be chosen arbitrarily. The
representation of < can always be preserved because, for any null event E′′, a
conditionally constant utility function uE′′(·) = cE′′ can also be introduced,
which will induce the same preferences. Thus it appears that, even when
all of his postulates are satisfied, Savage cannot claim to identify only one
subjective probability function pi<. Admittedly, the problem of null events
has a special status among the various state-dependent utility issues. Yet
null events are not the only ones to raise such underdetermination issues. In
a nutshell: there is also a problem of non-null events, to which we turn now.
2.5 Fourth variation: the downhearted husband
Consider this last reaction. Were his wife to die, Mr. Smith would be
downhearted: he would carry on with his life, but enjoy every bit of it less.
Let us suppose accordingly that uE∗(x) =
1
2x. For the sake of convenience,
27The kind of uniqueness clause to follow is not standard in discussions of Savage’s
theorem or related results. In this context, the only explicit statement we are aware of
is to be found in Wakker, 1987, p. 293. Albeit in a different analytical framework, it
has also been considered in recent models of awareness (see Karni and Vierø, 2013, p.
2802). Essentially, this clause describes a renormalization of the probability values of
non-null events. It amounts to making these values unique as on a ratio scale, rather than
absolutely unique as they normally are.
28We stress that this uniqueness clause is targeted at the problem of null events specif-
ically. In effect, the “only if” direction of the proposition below will be questioned by the
next variation on the case of Mr. Smith.
29The new probability function pi′< would contribute to representing the same under-
lying preferences, as stated in (1). But it would not represent the qualitative probability
relation those preferences induce, following Savage’s construction. This is precisely this
route to the identification of beliefs that is being questioned: the existence of an induced
qualitative probability relation is one thing, its relevance is another.
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let us also suppose that γ = 12 , so that pi
∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∗) = 12 .
Again, Mr. Smith’s preferences satisfy all of Savage’s postulates, and
the betting approach does not run into any apparent obstacle. Yet, while
Mr. Smith’s expert opinion is that pi∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∗), Savage must infer
from his preferences that pi<(E∗) > pi<(E∗).30 As in the previous variation,
the point is that even though all of Savage’s postulates are satisfied, Mr.
Smith’s preferences can be represented by several combinations of probability
and utility values. Undeniably, the particular aspect of the state-dependent
utility problem focused on here is the less known of all (nevertheless, see
Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, 1990, section 5 and Karni, 1996, section
2.131 for discussions).
It may come as a surprise that, under the stringent constraint of Sav-
age’s postulates, non-null events raise underdetermination issues similar to
the ones previously presented with respect to null events. The reason is that
the uniqueness of pi< in (1) is not absolute, but relative to the utility func-
tion that is chosen. And while the respect of Savage’s postulates implies that
there exists a state-independent utility function u : X → R such that the
decision-maker’s preferences can be represented according to the subjective
expected utility model, it does not imply that u is the only admissible func-
tion here. If u is admissible, then infinitely many state-dependent utility
30Consider (2), as fully specified with uE∗(x) =
1
2
x and E∗ = (0, 1
2
]. Taking any
consequences x, y such that x  y, check that xE∗y  xE∗y.
31Ever since this paper, Karni has tirelessly tried to make decision theorists aware of the
issue and to solve it one way or another. This paper is the closest to ours in the literature.
Unlike our paper, however, it focuses on this particular issue only, instead of discussing
together all state-dependent utility issues.
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functions u′ : X × S → R are also admissible32 inasmuch as that, together
with some jointly unique probability function pi′<, they induce the same pref-
erences. The respect of Savage’s postulates implies that it is always possible
to normalize state-dependent utilities to a state-independent function, not
that it is legitimate to do so. The underlying preferences being the same in
all cases, they cannot favor any specific decomposition over the others.
The devastated husband case and the downhearted husband case illus-
trate two sides of one issue, the first focusing on null events, the second on
non-null events. It is sometimes presented as the problem of state-dependent
utility without state-dependent preferences33 (so that one might also say, by
contrast, that the cautious husband case and the ascetic husband case illus-
trate the problem of state-dependent utility with state-dependent preferences).
Taken together, these last two variations indicate that Savage’s third and
fourth postulates are of no help in solving the belief identification problem.
Indeed, even when they are satisfied, only one unquestionable implication
can be drawn from the agent’s preferences: if an event is revealed non-null,
then it must be true that the agent associates a non-null subjective proba-
bility value to it. As the variations above illustrate, no other conclusion is
32The proof of the Anscombe-Aumann theorem illustrates the fact that a collection
of state-dependent utility functions is admissible here if and only if all (non-constant)
state-dependent utility functions are related by a positive affine transformation. It is then
always possible to interpret the transformation coefficients as probability weights. Among
others, Karni often makes the following algebraic observation (see e.g. Karni and Mongin,
2000, p. 238) which is suggestive of how arbitrary such a decomposition is. Consider
a preference relation < that is represented according to the subjective expected utility
model, with pi the probability function on a (for the sake of convenience, finite) state
space S, and u the utility function. Pick an arbitrary function a : S → R+∗. Define a new
utility w based on ws(x) = us(x) / a(s), for all x and all s, and a new probability σ based
on σ(s) = pi(s)a(s) /
∑
t∈S pi(t)a(t), for all s. It is readily checked that the product of σ
and w represents the same preferences. Focusing on the probability function in all these
representations, this illustrates the extent to which preferences underdetermine beliefs.
33See e.g. Karni, 1996, p. 259. In light of this issue, there is no reason to think that the
Ramseyan approaches to the identification of beliefs (see Ramsey, 1931 and e.g. Bradley,
2004 for a modern exposition) are not exposed to the problem of state-dependent utility.
More precisely, either these approaches are not able to express this problem (this will be
the case if their framework is such that no consequence is available in two different states
of nature, see Bradley, 2004, p. 494 for a discussion), or they are also exposed to it. Either
way, they do not solve this problem.
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robust, in particular none of the form “the decision-maker believes the event
E is more likely to occur than the event E′”. In other words, the accurate
uniqueness clause of Savage’s representation theorem is in fact the following.
In (1), pi< is replaceable by another probability function pi′< if and only if,
for any event E, if E is revealed non-null, then pi′<(E) > 0. Under this
weak constraint, it will always be possible to preserve the representation of
< by appropriately adjusting the utility side of it. Clearly, such minimal
identification of beliefs could be achieved even without Savage’s third and
fourth postulates.
The extensive underdetermination stated above is rarely recognized. Ar-
guably, again, this is best explained by highlighting how mathematical anal-
ysis is oriented by pre-existing interpretations. For the motivating semantics
of beliefs in terms of willingness to bet to make sense, so that preferences de-
liver beliefs directly as Savage’s fourth postulate suggests, utility needs to be
state-independent. Accordingly, whenever such a state-independent utility is
axiomatically available, decision theorists focus on it, at the risk of misstat-
ing the uniqueness of the representations they propose. They endorse the
implicit assumption of state-independent utility, which entails but exceeds
explicit assumptions of state-independent preference such as Savage’s third
and fourth postulates. Here more than elsewhere, it is hard to argue for this
assumption on methodological grounds of simplicity. Simplicity considera-
tions are especially convincing when the question is whether to keep some
property that is crucial from a theoretical point of view, but questionable
from an empirical point of view.34 Notice that this case does not apply here.
First, as our last two variations illustrate, some forms of state-dependent
utility are empirically indistinguishable from state-independent utility, in
the sense that the underlying preferences are the same. Accordingly, the
state-independent utility assumption has a non-empirical component, and it
34In decision theory under risk, the respect of von Neumann and Morgenstern indepen-
dence is sometimes defended against the Allais-type behavior on such grounds of simplicity.
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is questioned here not as an empirical approximation, but as a metaphysical
commitment of sorts. Second, the state-independent utility assumption is
all the more resistible, that only the betting approach seems to need it. As
mentioned in the introduction with a reference to insurance economics (to
which we related our first variation), state-dependent utility is well estab-
lished elsewhere, essentially, whenever the main problem is not to identify
beliefs. In other words, state-dependent utility is not an artifact of this prob-
lem and, considering economics as a whole, state-independent utility is not
a crucial property from a theoretical point of view.
2.6 Coda: the generality of the problem
Because of the various state-dependent utility issues, the betting approach
fails to identify Mr. Smith’s beliefs which are given by assumption in pi∗.
Following Savage’s method, there is either no function pi<, or too many
functions pi< suitably compatible with a given preference relation <. The
following table summarizes the essential aspects of the previous variations.
variation state-dependent utility issue illustrated
1 : uE∗(x) =
√
x < does not induce a likelihood order on the set of events
2 : uE∗(x) = −x < does not induce a qualitative probability relation on the set of events
3 : uE∗(x) = c < underdetermines the subjective probability of null events
4 : uE∗(x) =
1
2x < underdetermines the subjective probability of non-null events
summary of the four variations on the case of Mr. Smith
The problem of state-dependent utility is not a problem for Savage only.
Much of what has been said applies outside his framework. First, the problem
has been presented with respect to a Bayesian decision-maker, but it could be
presented with respect to non-Bayesian ones as well. Consider for instance
the existence issues illustrated by our first two variations. Savage’s third
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and fourth postulates are present in most representation theorems of models
of decision-making under uncertainty designed to accommodate Allais’ or
Ellsberg’s paradox.35 Besides, the issues illustrated by our last two variations
also apply in these cases. The problem of state-dependent utility proves
orthogonal to familiar decision-theoretic disputes about Bayesianism.
Second, the problem is relevant not only for decision theorists, but also
for practitioners who want to identify beliefs. This is because their concrete
elicitation techniques eventually rely on results just like Savage’s theorem.36
Third, the problem of state-dependent utility should concern not only
anyone interested in identifying beliefs, but also anyone interested in identi-
fying the utility function characterizing a decision-maker. The crux of state-
dependent utility issues is precisely that these two questions are inseparable,
and the four variations on the case of Mr. Smith could have been presented
on the utility side rather than on the probability side. As a result, these
issues are of interest to insurance professionals for more than one reason.
On the one hand, such professional need to identify utility to draw specific
implications from general insurance economics results. On the other hand,
they might also need to identify beliefs, as in circumstances in which the
use of actuarial statistics is problematic. This can be the case, in particular,
when so-called catastrophic or extreme risks are at stake.37 Such risks per-
tain to rare events on which limited statistical data is available, so that the
insurer usually has to rely on expert opinion. On a different score, the little
35For a model accommodating Allais’ paradox and relying on Savage’s third and fourth
postulates, see e.g. Machina and Schmeidler, 1992. For a model accommodating Ellsberg’s
paradox and relying on these postulates as well, see e.g. Gilboa, 1987 (Savage’s third
postulate is weakened in this case, but the key implication highlighted in section 2.3 is
still in place).
36Thus, the problem of state-dependent utility is yet another topic of discussion for the
methodological literature on scoring rules. Deviations from risk-neutrality already prove
challenging for standard scoring rules (for a presentation of the problem, see e.g. Schlag,
Tremewan, and van der Weele, 2015, section 2.4, and see Karni, 2009 for a solution). State-
dependent utility, which includes variations in risk attitudes as illustrated in section 2.2, is
therefore even more challenging for these rules (see Karni, 1999 for a partial investigation).
37Extreme risks, such as exceptional natural cataclysms, epidemics, or terrorist attacks,
raise distinctive problems for the economic theory of insurance (see e.g. Gollier, 1997).
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statistical data available typically is a poor guide to the beliefs guiding the
insuree’s behavior regarding the risks which the insurer can offer to cover.
3 Solving the problem of state-dependent utility
3.1 Facing the problem of state-dependent utility: an overview
The problem of state-dependent utility refers not to one of the issues consid-
ered in the previous section, but to all of them taken together. We now give
a brief overview of the four most significant responses to this problem which
have appeared in the literature. Our main purpose is to explain why the rest
of our paper focuses on only one of those responses. Incidentally, we want
to highlight some features this response shares with those other proposals.
Let us first mention a radical reaction to state-dependent utility issues,
which several decision theorists have explored.38 It is based on the fol-
lowing fact. Although state-dependent utility impedes the identification
of subjective probability, a weaker form of identification might nonetheless
be achieved, and it suffices to predict many aspects of individual behavior.
Specifically, under some conditions, preferences over uncertain prospects al-
low representations which, like (1), are additively separable over the state
space, but which, unlike (1), do not propose any separation of utility from
probability. The conditions at stake are satisfied by Bayesian decision-
makers. They are weaker than those of Savage’s theorem or related results.
In particular, Savage’s third and fourth postulates or related axioms can
be dispensed with. For terminological clarity, we say that in these cases,
preferences are representable by a collection of state-indexed value functions.
From the standpoint of interpretation, given a state and a consequence, a
38See in particular Wakker and Zank, 1999 and Hill, 2010. As these references discuss,
it is particularly challenging to obtain a general additively separable representation in
Savage’s framework (recall that, in this framework, the state space must be infinite and
notice that, without a probability function, integration is undefined). As the rest of our
paper illustrates, this is a much simpler task in the framework of Anscombe and Aumann.
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value is the unanalyzed product of the decision-maker’s beliefs regarding the
occurrence of this state, and the desirability for her of this consequence in
this state. Remarkably, such values suffice to predict many aspects of behav-
ior relevant to economics.39 The response proposed is to make do with the
identification of such values. As announced above, this is a radical response
to the problem of state-dependent utility, because it amounts to abandoning
the goal of identifying beliefs to replace it with that of predicting behavior.
As our paper explicitly endorses the former goal, by contrast with the latter,
we consider this response as unsatisfactory.40 One needs to find a way to
further analyze the kind of additively separable representations mentioned
in this paragraph, so as to separate out their probabilistic component.
Another typical reaction to our problem is to argue that cases like those
presented in the previous section are misdescribed and that, appropriately
re-described, they would cease to display any form of state-dependent utility.
Specifically, the argument is that unlike in our presentation, the consequences
which Mr. Smith contemplates are not just sums of money, such as “$50”,
but rather sums of money in a given state, such as “$50 and the operation
has failed” or “$50 and the operation has succeeded”. His case should be
remodeled accordingly, the argument goes, before it is examined in Savage’s
framework. Notoriously, this is Savage’s own reaction to the case of Mr.
Smith and related puzzles.41 Formally, it consists in redefining the conse-
quence set X as X × S, and in applying the whole approach to this new
consequence set. Trivially, the violations of Savage’s third and fourth postu-
lates sketched in the previous section would thus be dissolved, which seems
39See Nau, 2001 for a detailed defense of this claim.
40We would dismiss by the same argument the counter-objections to our last two vari-
ations on the case of Mr. Smith according to which, when all of Savage’s postulates are
satisfied, the state-independent decomposition in (1) is as good as any alternative state-
dependent decomposition because it is sufficient to predict individual behavior accurately.
This last point is correct (although it is important that it can be incorrect in some dy-
namic strategic settings, as detailed in Karni, 2008). Yet, if the goal is to identify beliefs,
this observation is a non-starter and the problem of state-dependent utility remains open.
41See Savage, 1954/1972, p. 25 and Savage and Aumann, 1987, pp. 78-80.
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to re-open the way for the identification of a subjective probability. Never-
theless, this approach has several unattractive features. On the one hand, it
generates infinitely many impossible acts in (X×S)S , the new set of acts, as
for example the constant act giving the consequence “$50 and the operation
has succeeded” in all states, including those in which the operation fails. On
the other hand, this approach overgeneralizes by excluding any conceivable
instance of state-dependent utility. This includes any case that could violate
Savage’s third and fourth postulates, while instead of being directly built
in the formalism, they are precisely left as “postulates”, i.e., conditions on
preferences that might not obtain. This also concerns any uncontroversial
case studied elsewhere, e.g. in insurance economics, where the main topic
is not the identification of beliefs. What is needed, however, is a solution
to the problem of state-dependent utility which lets state-dependent utility
be expressed. The response sketched in this paragraph does not meet this
requirement. Notice this is not because it introduces the set X × S as such,
but because it takes this set as the consequence set for another application
of Savage’s approach.
A far more ambitious response to the problem of state-dependent util-
ity is based on the consideration of moral hazard. Arguably, the betting
approach is exposed not only to the problem of state-dependent utility, but
also to the problem of moral hazard, understood as follows in our context. By
her actions, a decision-maker might influence the likelihood of some events
occurring, which complicates the identification of her beliefs regarding these
events. For a suggestive example, imagine that you are facing an archer and
that you want to identify his beliefs regarding his capacity to hit various
targets.42 When offered a bet such that he receives $100 if he misses a given
target, nothing if he hits it, he will have an incentive to miss it deliberately
and to accept this bet more readily than other bets. As a result, it will be
42This is essentially Drèze’s seminal example, see e.g. Drèze, 1987, p. 25.
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particularly difficult to infer from the bets he takes the beliefs he holds on
the events of interest. The moral hazard approach to the identification of
beliefs43 aims at solving at once the problem of moral hazard and the prob-
lem of state-dependent utility. This demands analytical frameworks which
are significantly different from Savage’s or related ones. Indeed, in the new
approach, the decision-maker is not just a bettor as we initially defined it,
i.e., someone trying to benefit from the way the world goes, but a full-fledged
agent that has some capacity to change the way the world goes. This cannot
be integrated to the traditional frameworks merely by revising the condi-
tions imposed on preferences, such as Savage’s third and fourth postulates.
This needs to be reflected in a new formalism. We also want to stress that
the problem of state-dependent utility can be solved following this approach
only if the problem of moral hazard can also be solved. The two problems,
however, appear conceptually independent. For example, it is one thing that
the archer cheats by missing the target deliberately (a moral hazard issue),
it is another that he is a bad loser and disregards any stakes he could win,
were he to miss the target (a state-dependent utility issue). What we need
here is a solution to the problem of state-dependent utility specifically, i.e.,
one that is available even when the decision-maker has no influence on the
events regarding which his beliefs are of interest. Mr. Smith, for one, has no
bearing on whether Mrs. Smith will survive the operation. A similar remark
would apply to an expert on macroeconomic conditions, for instance.
There is one approach in the literature which meets all the requirements
above, that is, it focuses specifically on the problem of state-dependent util-
ity, leaves room for state-dependent utility, and aims at identifying beliefs. It
is the hypothetical preference approach, which leads back to a result by Karni
43See Drèze, 1961 for the pioneering version of this approach, Karni, 2011a,b for a more
recent version. A key difference between these models is that, unlike the former, the latter
explicitly articulates the actions by which the agent affects the likelihood of events. This
leads to significantly different representations and interpretations of subjective probability.
23
and Schmeidler.44 In fact, as it will appear more explicitly in section 3.4,
we have an inclusive understanding of the hypothetical preference approach,
which goes beyond this particular theorem and its immediate generaliza-
tions. However, for the sake of concreteness and without loss of generality
regarding the point we want to make, this is the result which we present in
some detail. First, we sketch it technically. Second, we examine the concept
of preference underlying it. Third, we extract a philosophical message from
the way it bypasses state-dependent utility issues.
3.2 What the hypothetical preference approach allows
Mr. Smith is a Bayesian decision-maker. Accordingly, relying on his well-
defined conditional preferences, it should be possible to provide an additively
separable representation of his preferences. Following the terminology pre-
viously introduced, his preferences should be representable by a collection
of state-indexed value functions. Assume further that Mr. Smith’s state-
(in)dependent utility function is identified. Then, his subjective probability
function could be unambiguously factored out from such state-indexed value
functions. In essence, this is the strategy of the Karni-Schmeidler theorem,
the simplest of all the results following the hypothetical preference approach.
This result is established in three steps. The first step is set in a variant of
Savage’s framework, popularized by the Anscombe-Aumann theorem.45 In
this setting, besides the first and main source of uncertainty, the natural one
which is assumed to be the object of the decision-maker’s beliefs, a second
44It is stated in print as Theorem 1.4 in Karni, 1985. This result has been significantly
generalized in different directions (see Karni, 2003 and Grant and Karni, 2004). These
generalizations, however, do not matter for the philosophical discussion to come.
45From a mathematical point of view, it is also possible to think of Savage’s framework
as a variant of Anscombe and Aumann’s framework in which the consequences are all
degenerate lotteries. In the rest of this paper, for the sake of convenience, S is assumed
to be finite (see Fishburn, 1970, p. 179, for a generalization of the Anscombe-Aumann
theorem when S is infinite). As mentioned before, this assumption is not compatible with
Savage’s postulates, but it is compatible with the new set of postulates which we need
from now on.
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source of uncertainty is introduced. The new source is independent from the
natural one, and it follows a probabilistic law that is known to the decision-
maker. The combination of the two sources provides much structure to the
options she is presented with. Specifically, consequences are now lotteries
that should be played, once the true state of nature is revealed, for the
uncertainty she is facing to be fully resolved. Accordingly, let us keep the
same notation as before but interpret now the set X of consequences as
the set ∆(Z) of probability distributions with finite support in some set Z,
for instance the real interval [0, 100] still. Being asked to give a preference
relation < on F := XS , Mr. Smith is asked to decide between options such
as “a lottery (12 : $100,
1
2 : $0) if the operation succeeds, $50 otherwise” and
“$50 if the operation succeeds, a lottery (12 : $100,
1
2 : $0) otherwise”. Under
some conditions that express nothing more than his Bayesianism and do not
bear on state-dependent utility issues,46 it is possible to provide an additively
separable representation of the relation <.
Second, Mr. Smith is asked to express preferences on options of a new
kind. For his state-(in)dependent utility function to be identified as such, it
is necessary that his beliefs are somehow neutralized. This is what motivates
the introduction of the following special objects, which are tailored to that
effect. Consider hypothetical outcomes such as “$50 and the operation has
succeeded”. Notice they are distinct from more familiar conditional outcomes
such as “you receive $50 if the operation succeeds (and nothing otherwise)”.
Mr. Smith is asked to express preferences not only between such hypothetical
outcomes, but more generally between the lotteries over these outcomes. He
is asked to give a preference relation <̂ on the set ∆(S × Z). Notice that
this set ∆(S × Z) is not the set (S × Z)S , which would be the analogue in
46They are the conditions of the von Neumann - Morgenstern theorem. Nevertheless,
in the proof of the representation theorem, another supposition is needed. It can be
interpreted as a form of indifference regarding the order in which uncertainty is resolved.
Under this interpretation, it has been criticized by Drèze in relation with the problem of
moral hazard (see e.g. Drèze, 1987, p. 27).
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our context of Savage’s contentious set of (mostly) impossible acts. Unlike
(S × Z)S , ∆(S × Z) contains no self-contradictory option. Upon deciding
which of the lotteries in ∆(S × Z) he prefers, Mr. Smith can focus on only
one aspect, namely, the utility for him of any consequence x in any state s.
The probability that a state obtains is given by assumption in any such
option. Hypothetical lotteries are not uncertain, but risky prospects. As
a result, Mr. Smith does not have to draw on his own beliefs regarding
the likelihood of the possible states of nature. By construction, they are
somehow neutralized. Assume that, faced with hypothetical lotteries, Mr.
Smith has Bayesian preferences, just like he does when faced with ordinary
lotteries. Then it is possible to represent the relation <̂ according to the
expected utility model, and it is easy to make a state-(in)dependent utility
function appear explicitly in this representation. Admittedly, this function
might prove state-independent. Yet, this would be nothing more than a
particular case, moreover, one that would be deduced rather than assumed.
Third, the two relations < and <̂ are not necessarily compatible. Specif-
ically, there are well-defined conditional preferences in both cases and these
conditional preferences are comparable to some extent. But they might not
agree. Nevertheless, if they do,47 then it is possible to distinguish two com-
47This is what is required by the key linkage postulate of the Karni-Schmeidler theorem,
which consists in coordinating the conditional preferences of < and <̂. Some notation is
needed to introduce it formally. Denote by F̂ the set ∆(S × Z). For a generic element f̂
of F̂ , denote by f̂(s, z) the probability value associated by f̂ to the hypothetical outcome
(s, z). Denote by <̂s the hypothetical preference of the decision-maker conditional on state
s obtaining, defining it as follows: f̂ <̂s ĝ if f̂ <̂ ĝ, with f̂ and ĝ such that for all t 6= s ∈ S,
and all z ∈ Z, f̂(t, z) = ĝ(t, z). (Given that <̂ respects the so-called von Neumann
- Morgenstern independence, such conditional preferences are well-defined.) Denote by
F̂ ∗ the set of all elements of F̂ , the marginal probability of which have full support on
S. On the other hand, consider F and the relation < which is defined over it. For a
generic element f of F , denote by fs(z) the probability value associated by f to outcome
z in state s. Denote by <s the preference of the decision-maker on ∆(Z), conditional
on state s obtaining, defining it as usual. A bijection H can be defined between F̂ ∗ and
F , as follows: for all f̂∗, let H(f̂∗) denote the element f ∈ F such that for all z ∈ Z,
and all s ∈ S, fs(z) = f̂∗(s, z) / ∑y∈Z f̂∗(s, y). The key linkage postulate of the Karni-
Schmeidler theorem (labeled “strong consistency” by the authors) requires that for all
f̂∗, ĝ∗ ∈ F̂ ∗, and for any non-null s ∈ S, we have f̂∗ <̂s ĝ∗ if and only if H(f̂∗) <s H(ĝ∗).
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ponents in the state-indexed value functions of the initial representation: one
is the state-(in)dependent utility coming from the auxiliary representation,
the remaining component corresponds to the subjective probability.
This is a new approach to the identification of beliefs. It differs from Sav-
age’s or Anscombe and Aumann’s approach. Preferences are not assumed
to deliver beliefs directly, as Savage’s fourth postulate suggests. They are
barely assumed to contain the right information. More generally, the subjec-
tive probability measure does not emerge from cross-state, but from within-
state comparisons, namely, the comparison of state-indexed value and state-
dependent utility functions. Given this is how the hypothetical preference
approach defines subjective probability, it can be applied to circumvent al-
most all of the state-dependent utility issues listed in the previous section.
Following this approach, it is possible to identify the beliefs of cautious, as-
cetic or downhearted husbands. Admittedly, it is not possible to provide
a complete identification of a devastated husband’s beliefs. But a major
progress is made on this case too. Using hypothetical preferences, consid-
ering any null event, it is always possible to decide whether it qualifies as
cognitively null or as conatively null. Indeed, while this is undecidable in
most models, Karni and Schmeidler’s framework is rich enough for the follow-
ing definitions to be articulated. Denote by <E the preference conditional
on event E occurring, and similarly with <̂E , the hypothetical preference
conditional on E occurring. By definition, E is null if E= ∅. Take such
an E. If it is also the case that ̂E = ∅, define E as conatively null. Oth-
erwise, define it as cognitively null. The following table48 summarizes the
conceptual refinement proposed.
48It is adapted from Karni, Schmeidler, and Vind, 1983, p. 1025. These authors, how-
ever, have a terminology less informative than ours on this topic. They oppose “evidently
null” events to the “indeterminate case[s]”. They would be more specific in opposing “cog-
nitively” null events to “conatively” null ones instead.
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̂E = ∅ ̂E 6= ∅
E= ∅ E is conatively null E is cognitively null
E 6= ∅ - this case is excluded by the axioms - E is non-null
hypothetical preferences and the problem of null events
Notice that, accordingly, it becomes possible to assume away conatively null
events by a specific axiom without, more indiscriminately, requiring that all
events are non-null. If conatively null events are allowed and if there are
some such events for the decision-maker, then it can be not merely conjec-
tured, but demonstrated that her preferences underdetermine her beliefs.
Furthermore, using the uniqueness clause that has been presented before,
this underdetermination can be made precise. This is the only kind of un-
derdetermination that can remain, if the hypothetical preference approach
is followed. Accordingly, we propose to say that beliefs are then identifiable
up to a conatively null event (which can be categorized as such).
3.3 What the hypothetical preference approach requires
Such success comes at a price. First, there is loss of generality with re-
spect to Savage’s original framework, because beliefs are identified thanks to
exogenous probabilities. This refers not only to the elements of ∆(Z), but
also to the elements of ∆(S × Z).49 Savage committed to working with his
bare hands. This constraint is not respected any more in Karni and Schmei-
dler’s approach. Second, more importantly, beliefs are identified thanks to
hypothetical preferences, the operational meaning of which is doubtful. This
49However, those two kinds of exogenous probabilities are unequally essential to the
hypothetical preference approach. As illustrated in Karni, 2003 following previous work
by Wakker, under some conditions, the preliminary additively separable representation can
be obtained without exogenous probabilities of the first kind. Exogenous probabilities of
the second kind, by contrast, are instrumental in neutralizing the decision-maker’s beliefs
and identifying state-(in)dependent utility. It is more difficult to imagine how they could
be dispensed with (but see the alternative approach mentioned in footnote 57).
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accusation is worth being detailed, as follows.50 Each element f̂ of ∆(S × Z)
induces a marginal probability pif̂ on S. Undoubtedly, the intended inter-
pretation is that when a decision-maker evaluates f̂ , she should adopt pif̂ as
a hypothetical belief on the state of nature. Yet, if this is correct, what does
it mean to prefer, say, f̂ over ĝ ?
To answer this question, notice that the set ∆(S × Z) can be partitioned
according to the different marginal probabilities induced on S by its elements.
Given that we are considering a Bayesian agent, the following distinctions
are relevant. To start with, there is a cell of the partition, denoted by ∆∗,
which contains all the hypothetical lotteries inducing the marginal probabil-
ity pi∗ corresponding to the agent’s actual beliefs. Even though it cannot be
identified at first, it is known to exist, by assumption. Any other cell of the
partition, denoted generically by ∆◦, contains all the hypothetical lotteries
inducing some other marginal probability pi◦. Restricted to ∆∗, preferences
in <̂ can be interpreted as ordinary choices no more and no less than pref-
erences in <. Indeed, ∆∗ corresponds to the set XS as it is seen by the
decision-maker given what she believes the state of nature is. Restricted
to another cell ∆◦,51 preferences in <̂ can be interpreted as counterfactual
choices. With f̂ and ĝ two hypothetical lotteries inducing the same marginal
probability pi◦, f̂ <̂ ĝ could mean that, if she had this other set of beliefs
rather than the one she actually holds, the decision-maker would choose the
prospect described in f̂ , rather than the one described in ĝ.
50See Karni and Mongin, 2000, section 4.3, for another methodological discussion of
hypothetical preferences. By contrast with ours, Karni and Mongin’s discussion is more
concerned with assessing whether ordinary preferences really are immune to the criticisms
usually levied against hypothetical preferences. We focus here on the preliminary step of
clarifying those criticisms more completely than elsewhere in the current literature.
51Notice that in some cases, pi◦ may correspond to a Bayesian updating of pi∗ after
the reception of some information by the decision-maker. The restriction of hypothetical
preferences to a generic cell ∆◦ has been investigated in a theorem related to the Karni-
Schmeidler theorem (see Karni, Schmeidler, and Vind, 1983). It has been proved that it
would not be sufficient for beliefs to be identified uniquely (see Karni and Mongin, 2000,
section 3.4). To that end, it is indispensable to let hypothetical preferences be defined
across different cells of the partition, i.e., necessary to introduce an even stronger form of
hypotheticality than the one of counterfactual choices.
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Nevertheless, in general, preferences in <̂ are defined over pairs of el-
ements of ∆(S × Z) belonging to different cells of the partition of inter-
est. When they are defined over lotteries that induce mutually incompat-
ible marginal probabilities, preferences in <̂ differ most radically from or-
dinary choices. With two hypothetical lotteries f̂ and ĝ inducing conflict-
ing marginal probabilities, f̂ <̂ ĝ would mean that the agent would rather
choose the prospect described in f̂ , having the beliefs given in pif̂ , than the
one described in ĝ, having the beliefs given in piĝ.52 But, for a Bayesian
decision-maker, no such choice exists. She acts given some beliefs on the
state of nature, never across conflicting beliefs. Notice that the conflict is un-
avoidable in Karni and Schmeidler’s approach, because it underlies the basic
preferences on which the representation is built. Indeed, assume for instance
that Mr. Smith prefers the hypothetical outcome “$100 and the operation
has succeeded” to this other one, “$0 and the operation has failed”. Such a
preference cannot be equated with a choice, as both Mrs. Smith’s death and
Mrs. Smith’s survival are presented as certain at the same time. Neither
such basic comparisons, nor more sophisticated ones can be interpreted as
choices, be it counterfactually. They amount to impossible choices.53
Admittedly, the hypothetical preference approach should be considered
as a whole. In this approach, unlike in any approach which consists simply
in asking the agent about the beliefs she holds, beliefs are inferred from
preference data, part of which is indisputably interpretable as choice data.
Specifically, this is true of < and the restriction of <̂ to ∆∗. To this extent,
52Thus, hypothetical preferences are reminiscent of extended preferences which have
been considered in social choice theory (see in particular Mongin, 2001, sections 4 and 6).
Such preferences typically read as follows: “from the point of view of individual i, it is
better to be individual j in social state x, than to be individual k in social state y”. Like
hypothetical preferences, in general, extended preferences cannot be related to ordinary
or counterfactual choices.
53Notice the following contrast with Savage’s own proposal regarding state-dependent
utility issues. Savage’s approach introduces impossible options and, to that extent, im-
possible choices. Karni and Schmeidler’s approach introduces impossible choices, but no
impossible option (recall the difference between ∆(S × Z) and (S × Z)S , which we high-
lighted above).
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the beliefs identified are the ones upon which the agent is ready to act in her
own decision-making. Nevertheless, the beliefs identified are only partially
grounded in choices. For the identification issues raised by state-dependent
utility to be solved following the hypothetical preference approach, as we
detailed above, the crucial requirement is that preference data have to be
enlarged beyond choice data. We now claim that this is not an artifact of this
approach, but a necessary feature of any complete solution to the problem
of state-dependent utility, which deserves philosophical attention.
3.4 Hypothetical preferences in philosophical perspective
Assume you are facing a decision-maker who has no influence on the events
regarding which her beliefs are of interest to you. Then, we argue, enlarging
preference data beyond choice data is necessary to identify her beliefs, that
is, to solve the problem of state-dependent utility.
First, recall the last two variations on the case of Mr. Smith. They illus-
trate the problem of state-dependent utility without state-dependent pref-
erences. To solve this problem, choice data do not suffice. This point is in
fact consensual. Even critics of this problem agree, as they argue for the
identification of beliefs given in (1) by stressing that decompositions alter-
native to (1) cannot be distinguished from (1) based on observable choices.
This is also indirectly confirmed by Savage’s own approach. In effect, Savage
proposes a solution based on the assumption of state-independent utility.
This assumption can only be implicit in his framework, in the sense that it
cannot be fully articulated using his own primitive concepts. In Karni and
Schmeidler’s framework, by contrast, it can be made explicit. For Bayesian
decision-makers at least, it corresponds to the statement that, for any con-
sequence x, and for all states s and t, we have (x, s)∼̂(x, t). Yet, as we
previously observed, such preferences are hypothetical ones which cannot
be interpreted as choices (neither as ordinary ones, nor as counterfactual
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ones). Thus, instead of being an assumption of the decision theorist, state-
independent utility can truly represent the preferences of the decision-maker,
but this is only if preferences are allowed to extend beyond choices.
Second, recall the first two variations on the case of Mr. Smith. They
illustrate the problem of state-dependent utility with state-dependent pref-
erences. Considered in isolation from the previous one and by contrast with
it, this problem may seem more familiar and tractable. Yet we emphasize
that, as we proved in the previous section, it has two logically independent
sides. The issues illustrated by each side do not cancel out, but multiply.
Specifically, a robust solution to this problem should be able to define a sub-
jective probability for a decision-maker whose conditional utility functions
would be, say, u(x) = x on E1, u(x) = −x on E2, u(x) =
√
x on E3 and
u(x) = −√x on E4, with {Ei}4i=1 a partition of the state space. The fact that
such a preference structure would be implausible in most economic contexts
is irrelevant for the conceptual point at stake here. We are unaware of any
generalization of Savage’s theorem or related results that could construct a
subjective probability in this case based on the kind of preference informa-
tion available in Savage’s framework, i.e., without letting preferences extend
beyond ordinary choices. Some approaches aim at solving the problem of
state-dependent utility while keeping Savage’s informational basis. They try
to do so by relaxing his state-independence postulates. But their weaker
postulates too would be violated in this case, and no subjective probability
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could be constructed based on these postulates.54 We take cases like the one
above to illustrate the fact that with state-dependent utility, there might
never be enough structure common to the decision-maker’s conditional pref-
erences for any belief to emerge based on cross-state comparisons. Yet such
comparisons, put forward e.g. in Savage’s fourth postulate and related condi-
tions, are unavoidable if the beliefs underlying choices are to be inferred from
choice data alone. They can be dispensed with in the construction of subjec-
tive probability only if some access is gained to state-(in)dependent utility as
such, like in Karni and Schmeidler’s approach. This demands to neutralize
beliefs, hence to move away from ordinary choices. To sum up, even putting
aside the problem of state-dependent utility without state-dependent pref-
erences, it seems unlikely that the full problem of state-dependent utility
with state-dependent preferences can be solved without letting preferences
extend beyond choices. This is a new line of argument for the hypothetical
preference approach, which deserves to be highlighted.
The restriction of preference data to choice data has a name in the
economic literature: it defines the revealed preference framework. Strictly
speaking, revealed preference results55 examine the conditions under which
a choice function can be represented as induced by an underlying preference
54Consider for example the result in Hill, 2009, which is set in Savage’s framework.
It is the only such result we are aware of which proposes an identification of subjective
probability applicable when neither Savage’s third postulate, nor his fourth is satisfied.
It relies on generalizations of these two postulates, which would be violated in the case
above. Admittedly, in this case, the state space might be partitioned in such a way that,
conditional on any event within each cell of the partition (by contrast with events across
such cells), Savage’s third postulate holds, and likewise for his fourth. This last case is
investigated in Karni and Schmeidler, 1993. However, the partition relevant for Savage’s
third postulate might differ from the one relevant to his fourth, e.g., the third postulate
could be respected on either E1 ∪ E3 or E2 ∪ E4, while the fourth postulate would be
respected on either E1∪E2 or E3∪E4. Karni and Schmeidler’s 1993 result does not cover
this case nor indicates how to do so. We conjecture that it is intractable in Savage’s setup.
55See especially Samuelson, 1950 for the pioneering original competitive consumer ver-
sion of those results, and e.g. Sen, 1971 for the later more abstract set-theoretical version.
Sen, 1973 illustrates the now familiar philosophical discussions of the revealed preference
semantics according to which, in the results above, preference is defined in terms of choices
(see Hausman, 2000 for a more recent example of such discussions). Our discussion of the
revealed preference framework is distinct. In particular, the methodological issues consid-
ered below are relevant even if “choice” and “preference” are treated as distinct concepts.
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relation, i.e., they characterize the choice patterns associated with various
kinds of preferences. By extension, in a revealed preference framework, any
statement about preference translates in one about choice, and preferences
are observable in the sense choices are. This is not the case, for instance,
when preferences are the object of introspective reports only. Notoriously,
the revealed preference framework prevails in economic theory, which is one
aspect of its aiming to be an empirical theory. More importantly for our
purposes, it is usually taken for granted that this framework fits the needs
of economics, that is, it is understood that the bulk of economic theory can be
developed wholly within the revealed preference framework. Admittedly, this
framework might be restrictive with respect to our informal understanding of
preference, following which the domain of preference exceeds that of choice.
Nonetheless, as it is usually held, dissatisfaction with the revealed preference
framework grows only from outside economic theory.
This is where we wish to locate the problem of state-dependent utility,
which is a rare counter-example to the analysis above. Indeed, the take-
home message of this problem is that beliefs cannot be identified within a
revealed preference framework. Thus one thing has to go, i.e., one should
either weaken the goal of identifying beliefs, or relax the revealed preference
constraint under which this goal is aimed at. The qualifications given at
the very beginning of this section notwithstanding, economic theory cannot
abandon the goal of identifying beliefs. In particular, too many important
results rely on assumptions about the beliefs of a decision-maker, or explore
the assumption that several decision-makers share the same prior beliefs, for
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instance.56 Therefore, to identify beliefs, the revealed preference constraint
has to be relaxed to some extent. This is what is done in Karni and Schmei-
dler’s approach, by complementing revealed preference data with one care-
fully selected kind of non-revealed preference data. Karni and Schmeidler’s
hypothetical preferences are better described as genuine preferences over
hypothetical lotteries. Yet, in general, they amount to impossible choices.
Introducing such non-revealed preferences is a feature which is common to all
the approaches aiming at providing a comprehensive solution to the problem
of state-dependent utility.57 There might be other topics that illustrate the
fact that the revealed preference framework does not fully fit the needs of
economic theory.58 But the problem of state-dependent utility is the most
convincing case we are aware of. In the technical literature on which our
paper is based, this problem is not presented in this wider perspective about
the internal limits of the revealed preference framework.
In light of the above, we argue that philosophers would benefit from
paying closer attention to the problem of state-dependent utility. To our
56For example, some results in portfolio theory rely on assumptions about the investor’s
beliefs regarding the return of assets (see Karni and Schmeidler, 1993, p. 272 for a dis-
cussion of a classical theorem by Arrow in light of the problem of state-dependent utility
with state-dependent preferences). On the other hand, many results rely on a shared prior
assumption, especially in the interactive epistemology literature which we mentioned in
the introduction. Of special interest in our context is the use of such assumption to cir-
cumscribe the correct use of Pareto conditions in the literature about the aggregation of
preferences under uncertainty (see Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler, 2004, and a discus-
sion in Karni, 2007, section 3.1 in light of the problem of state-dependent utility without
state-dependent preferences). If beliefs are unidentified, none of these results is applicable.
57For instance, another important stream in the literature is the conditional expected
utility approach (see Luce and Krantz, 1971, Fishburn, 1973, and more recently Karni,
2007). In this approach, preferences are defined over acts conditioned on different events,
as when Mr. Smith prefers a certain act, knowing that the operation succeeds, to another
act, knowing that it fails. This amounts to acting across conflicting beliefs, and large parts
of the discussion of section 3.3 would apply there as well. This is why we claimed that
focusing on Karni and Schmeidler’s result entailed no loss of generality for our topic.
58For example, it is sometimes argued that, in order to carry out welfare evaluations, but
also to have a more unified theory of decision-making, economics needs a cardinal utility
applicable to decisions under certainty (see e.g. the discussion in Wakker, 1994, section
2). In general, however, preferences over certain options cannot deliver a cardinal utility,
unless one introduces a notion of preference differences in this context. Nevertheless, such
preference differences are generally held to be incompatible with the revealed preference
framework (see Fishburn, 1970, section 6.1 for a representative statement of this view).
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knowledge, they rarely consider it in great detail. This may be related to the
fact that they are often sympathetic to the re-description strategy sketched at
the beginning of this section59 (its other defects being set apart, this strategy
tends to hide the full extent of the problem). Nevertheless, they often think
about the appropriate method for investigating beliefs. In particular, they
have written extensively about the shortcomings of the “pragmatic” approach
to this issue. Admittedly, their typical targets are pragmatic arguments such
as the one trying to establish that the decision-maker’s beliefs should take
the form of a unique probability measure over a given state space. This is
the so-called Dutch Book argument, which many philosophers claim to be a
wrong kind of argument for a right normative conclusion. But we take it that
their interest for the appropriate method for investigating beliefs extends
beyond this case to any approach linking such investigation with that of
desires and choices.60 Accordingly, the problem of state-dependent utility
should be integrated into their reflection. This might be done in several
ways. Some might try to turn this problem into a general internal objection
to the pragmatic approaches. Specifically, they might try to argue that this
problem illustrates the self-defeatingness of the project aiming at inferring
beliefs from choices, instead of following another method more adapted to
epistemic issues. Other philosophers might scrutinize more carefully the
conclusion presented in this section, which involves more subtly not two,
but three concepts, namely, choice, belief, and preference. They could argue
that the problem illustrates the need of separating conative and cognitive
matters altogether, and thus of parting with the standard betting approach
more radically than it has been considered here. We leave it to them to judge
which of these and other ways best fits their own concerns. It is enough for us
59See e.g. the discussion about outcome individuation in Joyce, 1999, section 2.2.
60See e.g. Joyce, 1998 for a critique of the Dutch Book argument along the line men-
tioned. Regarding the wider understanding of the methodological topic under discussion,
see e.g. Joyce, 1999, p. 89, where “pragmatism” is defined as the claim according to which
“we can learn everything we need to know about epistemology by doing decision theory”.
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to have extracted from the problem of state-dependent utility a conceptual
message which is of clear interest to them.
4 Conclusion
The problem of state-dependent utility is usually underestimated. First, the
problem has many different aspects. As we illustrated with Savage’s the-
orem, four types of state-dependent utility issues stand in the way of the
betting approach to the identification of beliefs. Any specific model is chal-
lenged to solve each of those four issues. Second, as we illustrated with Karni
and Schmeidler’s theorem, the solution to this problem has a high method-
ological cost. In order to identify beliefs under state-dependent utility, with
or without state-dependent preferences, it is necessary to let preferences ex-
tend beyond choices. This is in itself a significant conceptual conclusion.
Given the importance of belief identification, this indicates that the revealed
preference framework does not fully fit the needs of economic theory. This
also suggests that philosophers, who think about the appropriate method
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6 Appendix
In this appendix, it is proved that preferences representable as in (2) with
uE∗(x) = −x and E∗ = (0, 23 ] respect Savage’s fourth postulate, namely:
∀E,E′ ∈ 2S ,∀x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X s.t. x  y, x′  y′ : xEy  xE′y ⇔ x′Ey′  x′E′y′.
First, it is readily checked that for those preferences, x  y ⇔ x > y. Next,
suppose that x  y and xEy  xE′y. Using (2), this is true if and only if:
pi∗(E).uE(x) + pi∗(E).uE(y) > pi
∗(E′).uE′(x) + pi∗(E′).uE′(y)
⇔ pi∗(E ∩ E∗)x− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)x+ pi∗(E ∩ E∗)y − pi∗(E ∩ E∗)y >
pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)x− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)x+ pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)y − pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)y
⇔ x [pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)] >
y
[
pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)] .
Noticing that pi∗(E′∩E∗)+pi∗(E′∩E∗) = pi∗(E∗) = pi∗(E∩E∗)+pi∗(E∩E∗)
and that pi∗(E′ ∩E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩E∗) = pi∗(E∗) = pi∗(E ∩E∗) + pi∗(E ∩E∗),
using the fact that x  y ⇔ x > y and x′  y′ ⇔ x′ > y′, the supposition is
true if and only if:
x
[
pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)] >
y
[
pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)]
⇔ [pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)] > 0
⇔ x′ [pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)] >
y′
[
pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)]
⇔ x′ [pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗)] >
y′
[
pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E ∩ E∗) + pi∗(E ∩ E∗)− pi∗(E′ ∩ E∗)]
⇔ x′Ey′  x′E′y′.
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